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Informational Externalities of Going Public Decisions: Evidence from 
Industrial Sector 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Theoretical models predict that going public firms generate positive externalities, 
creating a spillover effect for other firms to go public. In this paper, we posit that venture backed 
IPOs convey positive informational externalities for the publicly traded rival firms in the same 
industry and test three related hypotheses. The hypotheses are: 1) Venture backed IPOs convey 
positive information about industry and this information is transferred to rival firms; 2) Intra-
industry information transfer varies with rivals’ characteristics; 3) IPO price revisions generate 
additional information that affects rivals’ valuation. The results show that rivals have positive 
valuation effects only in response to venture backed IPOs and no significant reaction in response 
to non-venture backed IPOs. We also find evidence that the effect on rival firms is stronger if 
they operate in low concentrated industries (i.e. high competition) and have low growth 
opportunities. The relative size of IPO firm seems to play an important role in the direction and 
magnitude of industry rivals' valuation effects. Negative information revealed in the form of 
downward price revisions adversely affect rival firms’ valuation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
Introduction 
 Prior studies document positive informational externality effects of IPOs on potential 
issuers related by a common valuation factor (Subramanyam and Titman, 1999; Benveniste, 
Busaba and Wilhelm, 2002). The information revealed at the time firms file their prospectus with 
the SEC as well as the additional information revealed during bookbuilding phase, has a 
significant impact on potential issuers that operate in the same industry. Potential issuers 
condition their decision to become publicly traded companies depending upon the outcome of 
their contemporaries (the probability of withdrawal, price revisions, underpricing). Benveniste, 
Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2003) show that firms attempt to go public when positive 
information spills over from previous IPOs (i.e. lower underpricing). 
If initial public offering announcements reveal valuable information for potential issuers 
related by a common valuation factor, it is likely that investors in similar publicly traded firms 
use this information to reassess the value of their own firms' future prospects. Therefore, initial 
public offering announcements are likely to have externality effects for rival firms within the 
same industry.  
In this study we expand the current research by examining the informational externalities 
of going public decisions by industrial firms on existing publicly traded firms within the same 
industry (rivals).  
This study is guided by two primary motives: 1) To investigate which of two potential 
externalities of IPOs—competitive and contagion—is more powerful, and 2) To examine if 
differential externalities exist depending on whether or not an IPO is venture-backed. The first 
motive for examining this issue stems from the fact that two opposing theories on externalities 
predict conflicting results regarding the effect of an IPO on rival firms. An IPO, on one hand 
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might signal a change in industry's outlook (i.e. future growth opportunities) and therefore, bring 
about positive valuation effects for rival firms. On the other hand, the decision to go public might 
cause a reassessment of the competitive situation within the industry. Since the IPO firm raises 
equity funds that can be used to expand in the product market and compete more efficiently, rival 
firms may lose some of their market share. Therefore, this possibility predicts negative valuation 
effects for rival firms. 
Empirical evidence suggests that venture-backed IPOs convey superior information to 
IPOs that are not venture-backed. Empirical findings include: 1) Venture capitalists firms have 
access to top tier investment bankers (Megginson and Weiss, 1991); 2) Venture capitalists are 
successful in timing the decision to take the companies public (Lerner, 1994); 3) Brav and 
Gompers (1997) and Ivanov (2004) show that, venture backed IPO firms perform better than 
non-venture backed IPO firms. Lee and Wahal (2003) show that the difference in underpricing 
between venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs (6.2%-9.5%) represent a wealth transfer 
from venture capitalists to new shareholders. As a compensating benefit associated with 
incremental underpricing of venture backed IPOs, they document a positive relationship between 
the level of underpricing and future inflows of capital to venture capital firms. Overall, the recent 
empirical findings suggest that venture backed IPOs signal superior information to the market 
relative to non-venture backed IPOs. 
Only a limited amount of work exists regarding the impact of IPO announcements on 
rival firms within the same industry. Slovin, Sushka and Ferarro (1995) find that rivals react 
negatively to equity carve-out (non-traditional IPO) announcements. They interpret this result as 
unfavorable information about industry prospects conveyed by equity carve-outs to industry 
rivals. They further show comparable effects on rivals by firms that undertake traditional IPOs 
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(107 firms). However, they do not examine the event specific characteristics and industry 
characteristics that might explain the diverse rivals' reaction across industries. 
Melvin and Valero-Tonone (2003) examine the impact of firms' U.S. cross-listing on 
home-market rival firms. Since foreign firms list their shares for the first time in U.S. and 
typically the listing is accompanied by raising equity, they can be viewed as IPOs with potential 
information effects transferred to home-rival firms. The results show that rivals are hurt by the 
listing of other firms in their industry, suggesting that U.S. listed firms enhance the ability to take 
advantage of growth opportunities.  
Akhigbe, Borde and Whyte [ABW] (2003) examine whether an industry effect exists for 
initial public offerings. Their results show that IPO announcements are firm specific events, with 
no information transferred to industry counterparts. They interpret this result as offsetting 
information and competitive effects. However, caution needs to be exercised when interpreting 
the results reported by ABW. First, these authors do not separate the impact of venture capital 
backed from non-venture backed IPOs. Second, the authors pool all the IPOs in the sample 
without considering the difference in information structure between industrial and non-industrial 
firms.1 Finally, ABW do not control for confounding events pertaining to rival firms around IPO 
announcements that could potentially contaminate the rivals' stock price reaction to these 
announcements. 
                                                          
1 There are two reasons why this analysis should be partitioned on industrial firms and non-industrial firms. First, 
Diamond (1984, 1991) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) show that information structure of banking firms is 
different than that of industrial firms; hence, a bank public announcement might generate external information 
effects on other banks to an extend not found in industrial sector (Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek, 1992).  A bank 
decision to go public might not be entirely a voluntary action as it is for unregulated, industrial firms, but it reflects 
private information held by managers and regulators about bank's capital and the value of its loan portfolio. Second, 
the regulatory environment for utility and banking industries creates less diversity across firms. Kohers (1999) 
shows that intra-industry information transfer is more pronounced in homogeneous industries, because investors 
have higher propensity to draw inferences from public corporate events. 
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In this study, the major hypothesis is that going public firms generate significant 
informational externalities on rival firms in the same industry around IPO announcements. On 
average, the results show that there is a positive valuation effect for rivals, which seems to 
indicate that going public decisions signal positive industry prospects (i.e. future growth 
opportunities). However, when the sample is partitioned into venture backed IPOs and non-
venture backed IPOs, rivals have positive valuation effects only in response to venture backed 
IPOs and no significant reaction in response to non-venture backed IPOs. We also find evidence 
that the effect on rival firms is stronger if they operate in less concentrated industries (i.e. many 
competitors) and have low growth opportunities. The relative size of the IPO firm seems to play 
an important role in the direction and magnitude of industry rivals' valuation effects. Rivals 
experience larger wealth gains in response to a relatively larger entrant within the same industry. 
Negative information revealed at the offering date in the form of downward price revisions has a 
negative impact on rivals' valuation. In spite of a downward price revision, an IPO firm may not 
withdraw the offer probably because it wants to expand early in the product market, posing a 
threat to rival firms. 
This paper is organized as following: section 1 develops the hypotheses; section 2 
discusses the sample and methodology. We report the results in section 3 and section 4 
concludes. 
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1.  Hypotheses 
1.1. Intra-industry information transfer around IPO announcements 
 Previous literature has shown that various firm-level announcements have implications 
for rival firms. If the information disclosed has industry-wide implications, then rival firms 
experience contagion effects (the direction of rivals' abnormal returns is the same as that of the 
announcing firm). If the information revealed has competitive implications, rival firms' abnormal 
returns have opposite direction than that of the announcing firms. Finally, information pertaining 
to some corporate events is firm specific; therefore, there is no spillover or competitive effect on 
rival firms. 
 If the information disclosed by IPO firms at the time they file with SEC has externality 
effects as suggested by theoretical studies, then investors in similar companies use this 
information to evaluate the value of their own firms' future prospects. Therefore, IPO 
announcements are likely to affect stock prices of rival firms, thus having an industry-wide 
implication. To test whether information conveyed by IPO announcements has an impact on the 
equity value of rivals, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: An IPO announcement has a significant valuation impact on rival firms. 
 
 
The rivals' reaction to IPO announcements can be either positive or negative depending 
on how investors use the information revealed to make inferences about non-announcing firms' 
future prospects. However, the positive and negative reactions are not mutually exclusive. Thus, 
the rivals' reaction to IPO announcements is the sum of these two opposing effects. Either a 
significant positive or negative net effect indicates that IPO announcements reveal information 
that has industry-wide implications. 
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1.1.1. The positive reaction prediction 
According to market timing hypothesis, firms have the propensity to go public when 
industry market-to-book ratios are especially high (Lerner, 1994). Also, Lowry (2002) shows 
that high IPO volume occurs when private's firm demand for capital is high, adverse selection 
cost of equity is low and investors are overoptimistic. If going public decision signals positive 
industry prospects (i.e., future growth opportunities), the average market to book value of the 
already publicly held firms should increase. Thus, it is possible that going public decisions may 
potentially have positive externalities on market valuation of similar public firms.  
 
1.1.2.. The negative reaction prediction 
Macsimovic and Pichler (2001) explore a setting in which the going public decision 
conveys valuable information to competitors in the product market. By raising capital in the IPO 
to expand a new technology, firms may convey strategic comparative advantages within 
industry, and therefore, competitors face the probability of being displaced by a more 
technologically advanced rival. This implies that rival firms should react negatively at the time 
of the IPO announcements. An even clearer negative reaction prediction stems from the signaling 
product quality at the time of IPO (Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner, 2001). By offering to sell 
stock in their firm, entrepreneurs are stating that they believe the firm has high quality products. 
When an IPO is announced and a prospectus is released, sensitive information regarding the firm 
and its industry is published. As the stock price rises, favorable publicity surrounding the firm 
improves consumers’ perception of the quality of the firm’s products. As consumers increase 
their product purchases, the stock price responds favorably, increasing the profits of the firm. 
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The stock prices of competitors can fall when a new IPO is announced if new information 
conveys more positive prospects for the issuing firm than for the growth of the industry. 
 
1.2. Venture backed IPOs vs. non venture backed IPOs 
Venture capital firms specialize in collecting and evaluating information of start-up and 
growth companies, which are more likely to be prone to information asymmetries and capital 
constraints. Because venture capitalists firms have access to top tier investment bankers 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991), venture capital firms may partially overcome the information 
asymmetry associated with start-up and growth companies and thus, a venture capital backed 
firm will be less dependent on its internally generated funds. Also, venture capitalists are 
successful in timing the decision to take the companies public (Lerner, 1994). A venture-backed 
company goes public when its valuation is at the absolute, short-run peak and when the industry 
valuations are highest. By successfully timing the IPO, venture capitalists derive significant 
benefits, even though they rarely sell shares at the time of the offering. Taking companies when 
equity values are high minimizes the dilution of the venture investor's ownership stake. Brav and 
Gompers (1997) show that, venture backed IPO firms perform better than non-venture backed 
IPO firms, and the market incorporates these expectations at the time of going public. Therefore, 
a venture backed IPO signals superior information to the market than a non-venture backed IPO. 
Ivanov (2004) shows that venture backed IPOs have significant higher underpricing than non-
venture backed IPOs and the valuations do not change much in the long run (five years after 
IPO). Consistent with Brav and Gomper's (1997) findings, venture backed IPOs perform better in 
the long run than non-venture backed IPOs. Also, a significant portion of venture capitalists 
consists of corporate venture capitalists that have valuable industry expertise. When they bring 
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companies public, the certification role played by venture capitalist may explain why investors 
are willing to pay more for venture backed IPOs. However, this higher underpricing represent a 
real cost for venture capitalists, since they rarely sell shares in the IPO. Lee and Wahal (2003) 
show that the difference in underpricing between venture backed and non-venture backed IPOs 
(6.2%-9.5%) represent a wealth transfer from venture capitalists to new shareholders. As a 
compensating benefit associated with incremental underpricing of venture backed IPOs, they 
document a positive relationship between the level of underpricing and future inflows of capital 
to venture capital firms. Thus, the "grandstanding" behavior documented by Gompers (1996) 
explains the costs that venture capitalists are willing to bear in taking their portfolio companies 
public.  Overall, the recent empirical findings suggest that venture backed IPOs signal superior 
information to the market relative to non-venture backed IPOs. 
One important prediction derived from signaling and timing ability of venture capital 
firms at the time they go public is that industry rivals will react differently to IPO 
announcements, depending on whether the IPO is venture backed or not. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H2: A venture backed IPO, compared to a non-venture backed IPO has higher 
valuation effect on rival firms. 
 
 
1.3. Relative size of IPO firm 
The bigger the size of the IPO firm relative to the industry, the more information an IPO 
is expected to convey. Therefore, the larger the relative size of IPO firm, the greater the impact 
on industry rivals' reactions. To examine whether the relative size of IPO firm has a differential 
impact on stock price responses of industry rivals, we compute the relative size of IPO as the 
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ratio of IPO firm's total assets to industry rivals' total assets within the same four-digit SIC code. 
This measure is more appropriate than IPO proceeds, since the size of IPO is related to the size 
of industry rivals. To test whether the relative size of IPO firm has a differential impact on 
industry rivals, we hypothesize that: 
 
H3: The larger the relative size of IPO firm, the greater the valuation impact on the 
rivals. 
 
 
1.4. Intra-industry reaction and rivals' specific characteristics 
 The impact of IPO announcements is not expected to be the same for all firms in the 
same industry. Rather, the differences in firm characteristics (for example, rival's size, its ability 
to take advantage of the future growth potential, and whether it belongs to a concentrated 
industry, etc) will dictate the direction and magnitude of rivals' reaction in response to IPO 
announcements.  
 
Rival firm size: 
 Atiase (1985) argues that information production and dissemination are positive function 
of firm size. Thus, the expected change in valuation induced by public announcements should be 
inversely related to firm size. Atiase reports evidence consistent with this argument in that there 
is a larger share price reaction to earnings announcements for small firms relative to that of large 
firms. Also, Slovin, Sushka and Bendek (1991) find that industry rivals' excess returns generated 
by announcements of going-private transactions are a function of rival size relative to size of the 
target. To test whether abnormal returns of rival firms in response to IPO announcements are a 
function of rival’s size, we classify rival firms based on whether their size is greater (lower) than 
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industry median. The intra-industry effects should be greater (smaller) for relatively smaller 
(larger) rival firms. 
 
Rival market-to-book ratio: 
Market-to-book ratio is a common proxy for growth opportunities. Rivals' growth 
opportunities may influence their ability to respond to the competitive threat of a new publicly 
traded firm within an industry or to incorporate new growth opportunities available in that 
industry.  
If IPO announcements signal positive prospects for industry (i.e. future growth 
opportunities), then rivals with high market-to-book ratios are likely to react more positively than 
those with low market-to-book ratios. On the other hand, especially in less concentrated 
industries where competitive shifts in market shares might take place, low market-to-book ratio 
rivals may not have the ability to respond to the competitive threat of a new publicly traded firm 
with greater resources. Therefore, we predict a more positive reaction for rivals with high 
market-to-book ratios than that of rivals with low market-to-book ratio and a negative reaction 
for rivals with low-market-to-book ratios that operate in low concentrated industries. To test 
whether the rivals react differently in response to IPO announcements, we classify rival firms as 
high (low) market-to-book ratio firms if their market-to-book ratio is above (below) industry 
median. Market-to-book ratio is computed as market value of equity plus book value of liabilities 
divided by book value of total assets. We predict a positive relationship between the rivals' 
ability to take advantage of growth opportunities (or to respond to a competitive threat) and their 
reaction at the IPO announcements. 
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 Industry concentration: 
 Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner (2001) explore the second most cited motivation for a 
firm's decision to go public, namely, the product market motive. The argument used to model the 
going public decision is based on the interaction between information generated by investors and 
analysts of a publicly traded firm, on the one hand, and consumers who discern product quality 
from the stock price, on the other hand. The model predicts that only better quality firms will go 
public. Therefore, going public announcements provide a signal to consumers that the IPO firm 
has a high quality product. This has a negative impact on rivals' profits, since they charge lower 
prices. The product market explanation of going public decisions is relevant especially in 
industries where the competitive dynamics play a major role for long term success of companies.  
Generally, announcing an IPO conveys bad news for competitors in less concentrated 
industries, since the announcement might signal higher product quality to consumers and, thus, 
lowers the price the competitors can charge for their products/services. This prediction suggests 
that an IPO announcement in low concentrated industry is likely to reveal unfavorable 
information for its competitors leading to shift in comparative advantages for non-announcing 
firms. To test this implication, we classify rival firms in two groups: those that belong to highly 
concentrated industries, i.e. their industry Herfindhal Index (HI) is above the median index for 
all industries, and those that belong to less concentrated industries. The Herfindahl Index (HI) is 
computed as the sum of squared market share of each firm relative to all other firms within the 
four-digit SIC code. Market share is defined as the firm's annual sales at the end of fiscal year 
prior to the IPO announcement divided by industry sales. 
 
H4: Cross-sectional differences in IPO externalities can be explained by specific 
characteristics of rival firms. 
 
 14
1.5. IPO price revisions and the valuation impact on rivals 
 The process of going public is a two-way information channel: the IPO firm reveals 
valuable information about its prospects and performance at the filing date and receives 
information from informed investors during the registration period known as book-building 
phase (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). With bookbuilding, typically, a preliminary offer price 
range is set when firms file their prospectus with SEC. Then, underwriters and issuers market the 
offer to prospective investors. If there is a strong demand for the IPO, underwriter will set a 
higher offer price relative to mid file price. The difference between offer price and mid file price 
represents the price revisions. Upward/downward price revisions depend on the investors' 
demand for IPO and also the underwriter's willingness to keep underpricing within reasonable 
limits (i.e. "leaving less money on the table").  
Lowry and Schwert (2002) explain the positive relation between initial returns and 
subsequent IPO volume as a consequence of information learned during the registration period. 
Positive information (upward price revisions) learned during an IPO's book-building phase 
results in a high initial return and, consequently, a higher market-to-book value for the IPO firm. 
If additional information revealed during book building affects not only the initial returns for the 
offering but also the subsequent volume of public offerings in the same industry, it implies 
valuation effects for similarly publicly traded firms. In other words, investors in similar firms use 
this information to reassess the value of their own firms' future prospects when they observe 
upward/downward price revisions. To test whether IPO price revisions have valuation effects on 
rival firms, we hypothesize that: 
 
H5: Rivals experience positive (negative) wealth effects when an IPO undergoes an 
upward (downward) price revision on the offer date. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
 
2.1. Sample Selection 
 In this study we examine the rivals' share price reactions in response to IPO 
announcements by industrial firms for the 1983-2001 period. The list of IPOs comes from 
Thompson Financial Security Database (SDC-Global Issue Database). In addition to the filing 
date and issue date, SDC also reports many aspects of the IPOs, such as: offer price, filing price 
(low, high, mid), venture backed IPOs, non-venture backed IPOs, etc. 
 SDC database contains 6,423 IPOs by industrial firms for the 1983-2001 period. We 
exclude the following IPOs: rights issue (1), unit IPOs (925), foreign IPOs (2), IPOs with offer 
price less than $51 (319) and IPOs not identifiable in the CRSP database. This step reduces the 
sample to 5,176 IPOs. 
 The final sample for industrial firms is constructed in a three-stage process as described 
below. In the first stage, we require that each IPO firm to have available financial information in 
the Compustat database (total assets, total liabilities, and shares outstanding) in the first year of 
listing. This allows us to compute size, growth options and relative size of IPO firm, since the 
IPO proceeds is not always a good proxy for the IPO firm size. This criterion reduces the sample 
to 3,810 IPOs.  
In the second stage, the sample is further reduced when we construct the sample for new 
firms. In so doing, we follow three steps. First, we assign each firm for which daily stock returns 
are available on the CRSP files to a four-digit SIC code (see Lang and Stulz, 1992). We exclude 
IPOs that are in their first year of listing. Second, we construct a list of rival firms that do not 
have a major public announcements such as mergers, seasoned equity offerings, stock splits, 
                                                          
1 Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2003), Lowry and Schwert (2004), etc eliminate all IPOs whose offer 
price is $5 or less. 
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dividend and repurchases around IPO announcements (30 day period centered at the IPO filing 
date). Finally, to ensure that each IPO firm is matched with a representative portfolio of rivals, 
we require that each IPO has at least 5 rivals (same industry, same year), with required financial 
data (total assets, sales, total liabilities) available in the Compustat database.  
The final sample of IPOs consists of 1,681 IPOs, with 38,791 rivals in 290 different four-
digit SIC codes. 
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics: 
Table 1 presents the frequency of IPOs across years. There are 563 venture backed IPOs 
and 1,118-non venture backed IPOs for 1983-2001 period. The bulk of IPOs (40% of the sample) 
occurs during 1992-1997 period. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of selected variables for 
IPO sample: proceeds, market-to-book ratio, and total assets. The median proceeds raised by 
venture-backed IPOs is $30 million, compared to $26 million of non-venture backed IPOs. In 12 
out of 19 years, the median proceeds raised by venture-backed IPOs are greater than those of 
non-venture backed IPOs. The median market-to-book ratio of venture backed IPOs is 2.4, 
whereas that of non-venture backed IPOs is 1.8. The full sample of IPOs has a median market-to-
book ratio of 2.0 and median total assets of $62 million, which are similar to those reported by 
Akhigbe et al. (2.05 and $50.36 respectively).  
Table 3 describes the selected variables for rivals' sample. A total of 38,791 rivals were 
identified for the sample period in 290 different SIC codes. The exact composition of rival 
portfolios varies with the timing of the event. The average number of rivals per IPO event is 
28.83, the median is 17, the minimum is 5 (to ensure a well representative portfolio of rivals) and 
the maximum is 408. 
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The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities 
to book value of total assets. Total assets and sales are end-of fiscal year values from Compustat 
database. The median rival firm has $68.95 million in total assets, $69.37 million in sales and a 
market to book ratio of 1.54. Akhigbe et al. report a median market-to-book ratio of 1.1 and 
median total assets of $51.74 million for the industry rivals' sample. The differences might be 
explained by the fact that the authors match the IPOs with at least one rival firm in the same 
four-digit SIC code, whereas in this study we require at least five firms in the same four-digit 
SIC code to ensure a well representative portfolio. 
 
2.3. Methodology 
 To capture the valuation effects of industry rivals in response to IPO announcements, we 
use event study methodology to measure the industry rivals' share price reaction. Day 0 is the 
registration date on the Registered Offerings of Securities tape of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Daily share prices for rivals' sample are from the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP). To measure abnormal returns, we employ the market-adjusted model 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). 
tmtptp RRA ,,, −= , where is the return on the CRSP value weighted index for day t.  tmR ,
 This model is well specified when securities come from the same industry group and especially 
when there is a clustering in events. Brown and Warner point out that there could be a high 
degree of cross-sectional dependence in market/market adjusted model and potential 
misspecification. To account for potential cross-correlation of returns induced by a clustering of 
industry observations in calendar time, we construct an equally weighted portfolio of rival firms 
within the same industry (4-digit SIC code) and perform event tests on the returns to the industry 
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portfolios.  To test whether there is a significant difference in mean (median) cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) between two subsamples, we use t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
respectively.  
The next step is to analyze the cross-sectional variation in intra-industry information 
effects of IPO announcements. Previous studies show that industry characteristic, rival-specific 
characteristics and event-specific characteristics can explain the variations in intra-industry 
information effects. Based on theoretical predictions of going public decision, we estimate the 
following model: 
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The dependent variable is the three-day CAR of each industry rival in response to the 
announced initial public offering of firm i.  is the pre-IPO concentration level in the 
4-digit SIC code. We use Herfindahl Index (HI) to measure the concentration level. The 
concentration variable is obtained by multiplying the HI by a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if rival operates in a highly concentrated industry and zero otherwise. 
equals 1 if the rival size (proxied by pre-IPO total assets) exceeds industry median. 
 equals 1 if the M/B ratio of rival firm exceeds industry median.  is 
an interactor variable that takes value of one if IPO is venture backed and zero otherwise. 
 is the relative size of IPO firm computed as the ratio of IPO firm's total assets to 
rival's total assets. 
iCONCMKT
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3. Empirical Results 
 
3.1. Rivals' valuation effects at the IPO announcement date: 
 
We use three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for equally-weighted rival 
portfolios as a measure of information transferred from IPO firms to rivals. Table 4 presents both 
mean and median CARs for all rivals and for subsamples based on rivals' characteristics. Both 
mean (0.371%) and median (0.279%) CARs for the entire sample are positive and significantly 
different from zero, which suggest that going public decisions have positive externalities effects 
on existing publicly held firms that share a common valuation factor. Benveniste, Ljungqvist, 
Wilhelm and Yu (2003) find a positive effect of going public decisions on privately held firms 
within the same industry. The likelihood of going public is determined by the factors such as: 
previous IPOs' underpricing, price revisions, and withdrawals. They conclude that firms decide 
to go public when they observe positive outcomes (i.e. less underpricing) from their 
contemporaries (i.e. firms that go public in about the same time). The positive reaction for rivals 
support the hypothesis that going public decisions signal positive prospects for industry and this 
information conveyed at the filing date is transferred to similar publicly traded firms.  
When discussing the hypotheses, we indicated that the net wealth effect of an IPO on its 
rivals is the sum of potentially two opposing consequences.  It is possible that some rivals react 
positively and some negatively. Partitioning the rivals based on their characteristics (market-to-
book value, size), generate different reactions in response to IPO announcements. Table 4 shows 
that rivals with market-to-book value higher than the industry median experience a positive and 
significant reaction (0.356%) in response to IPO announcements, whereas those with market-to-
book value below industry median have no significant valuation changes (at the median level). 
The median reaction of large size rivals is positive and significant (0.302%), but the median 
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reaction of small size rivals is insignificant. This is inconsistent with previous studies in intra-
industry information transfer that document a negative relation between the expected change in 
valuation induced by a public announcement and firm size (Atiase, 1985, and Slovin et al., 
1991). It might be the case that the insignificant reaction of small size rivals is the result of 
offsetting positive and negative effects.  
 
3.2. Variations in Rivals’ Abnormal Returns 
3.2.1. Univariate Analysis 
The major hypothesis in this study is that venture backed IPOs signal positive 
information about the related industry and this has a significant positive impact on stock prices 
of rival companies. To shed more light on the rivals' valuation effects in response to IPO 
announcements, we analyze the rivals' CARs for two different subgroups, based on whether IPO 
is venture backed or not. Within each group, we split the sample into subgroups based on rivals' 
specific characteristics (market-to-book ratio, size and industry concentration). Previous studies 
show that venture backed IPOs convey positive signals to the market (Brav and Gompers, 1997) 
and, therefore, investors might incorporate these expectations at the filing date.  
Table 5 shows the CARs for rival portfolios in response to venture backed IPOs (Panel 
A) and non-venture backed IPOs (Panel B). The median wealth effect experienced by rivals 
when an IPO is venture backed is positive (0.293%) and significant at the 1% level. The median 
CARs, however, are insignificant for rivals when IPOs are not venture-backed.  These results 
imply that the average positive reaction of rivals is driven by the presence of venture backed 
IPOs. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a venture backed IPO signals better prospects 
for the IPO-affiliated industry than when an IPO is not backed by venture capitalist.  
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Table 5 also reveals that when IPOs are venture backed, higher M/B rivals enjoy positive 
and statistically significant wealth gains. Although lower M/B rivals show positive gain, this 
result is not significant. On the other hand, when IPOs are non-venture backed, higher M/B rivals 
experience positive but insignificant wealth gain, while lower M/B rivals negative (significant at 
the 10% level) abnormal returns. These results lead us to conclude that the positive effect 
signaled by venture-backed IPOs exceeds the negative (competitive) effect due to a new entrant, 
but when an IPO is not backed by venture capital, the negative effect is more pronounced for 
lower M/B (poorer performing) rivals. 
Based on industry concentration level, rivals reaction in response to venture backed IPOs, 
is positive and significant, but insignificant in response to non venture backed IPOs. This 
suggests that regardless of the level of competition in the industry they operate, investors in rival 
firms interpret the positive signal of venture backed IPO announcements as having industry wide 
implications. The magnitude of rivals' reaction is higher for those in less concentrated (more 
competitive) industries (0.390%) than those in highly concentrated industries (0.240%). 
However, the differential impact is not statistically significant. It seems that rival firms in highly 
concentrated industries get lower net benefits from the positive information signaled by venture 
backed IPO announcements. In the absence of a venture-backed IPO, neither high- nor low-
concentration rivals win. 
Lang and Stulz (1992) provide the important result that information transfer can differ 
across industries depending on the concentration level. Their results suggest that an 
announcement made by a firm in a low concentrated industry is likely to reveal comparative 
information for industry rivals. Following their procedure, we use Herfindhal Index to split the 
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rivals in highly concentrated (above median HI) and less concentrated (below median HI) 
groups.  
Table 6 shows the mean and median 3-day CARs for both groups. At the mean level, 
rivals in low concentrated industries (i.e. high competition) have a higher reaction than those in 
highly concentrated industries; however, the difference between the two groups (High-Low) is 
not statistically significant.  
To further examine the impact of industry concentration level on rivals' reaction in 
response to IPO announcements, we measure the information transferred based on various cross-
classifications: industry concentration and rivals' market-to-book value and industry 
concentration and rivals' size.  Table 7 presents the mean and median 3-day CARs for rival 
portfolios based on both rivals' and industries' specific characteristics. Panel A shows the rivals' 
reaction in response to venture backed IPOs. The significant negative CAR of 0.14% suggests 
that rivals with low market-to-book value that operate in less concentrated industries have a 
competitive disadvantage when a competitor goes public. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that, in a competitive environment (low concentration), rivals with low growth opportunities 
(poor performing rivals) do not have the ability to respond to the competitive threat of a new 
entrant. Rivals with high market-to-book value experience positive valuation effects (0.07%) if 
they operate in highly concentrated industries and have no significant valuation changes if they 
operate in less concentrated industries. Consistent with Atiase's (1985) argument, rivals' size 
plays an important role in information transferred. Depending on the level of concentration and 
rival's size, the magnitude of information transferred differs. At the median level, for example, 
small size rivals' CAR is more pronounced in less concentrated industries (-0.19%) than in 
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highly concentrated industries. These results suggest that small size rivals are more vulnerable in 
a competitive environment. 
When IPOs are not venture backed, all rivals irrespective of the quality (above- and 
below median M/B) or size (above- or below-median size) lose (significant at least at the 10% 
level) in less concentrated industries. This result implies that in the absence of venture capitalists 
at the time of IPO, competitive effect is more pronounced. 
 
3.2.2. Relative size of IPO firm 
The size of IPO firm relative to the size of industry rivals may convey different 
information to industry rivals. The larger the relative size of IPO firm, the greater the impact on 
industry rivals' reactions, because large IPO firms convey more information for industry 
counterparts. Table 8 shows the impact of IPO firms' size on industry rivals' valuation effects. 
Rivals are classified in quartiles, based on the relative size of IPO firm (smallest IPO firms-1, 
largest IPO firms-4). Except for quartile 1, both mean and median rivals CARs are positive and 
significant. This suggests that relatively small IPO firms do not have a significant impact on 
rivals, but as the relative size of IPO firm increases (quartile 2 to quartile 4), rivals experience 
significant wealth gains in response to IPO announcements. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the larger the relative size of IPO firm, the higher the rivals' reaction. The 
difference in mean/median between quartile 1 and quartile 4 is significantly different for all 
windows. This implies that larger IPOs (Q4) convey more information than smaller IPOs (Q1) 
and this information has industry-wide implications. 
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3.2.3. Multivariate analysis 
The univariate results provide evidence that rival firms react differently to IPO 
announcements depending upon event specific characteristics and rivals' specific characteristics. 
To examine the cross-sectional variation in intra-industry information effects of IPO 
announcements, we estimate the following model: 
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The abnormal returns are computed for each individual rival using market-adjusted 
model. The dependent variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of each individual rival 
and the independent variables are factors that may explain the variation in rivals' valuation 
effects in response to IPO announcements.  is the pre-IPO concentration level in the 
4-digit SIC code. Herfindahl Index (HI) measures the concentration level. The concentration 
variable is obtained by multiplying the HI by a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if 
HI>median and zero otherwise. equals 1 if the rival size (proxied by total assets, 
prior to the IPO announcement) exceeds industry median. iB/  equals 1 if the M/B rati
of rival firm exceeds industry median iO  is an interactor variable that takes value o
one if IPO is venture backed and zero otherwise.  is the relative size of IPO firm 
computed as the ratio of IPO firm's total assets to rival's total assets. 
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Table 9 presents the cross-sectional results based on individual rivals' CARs at the IPO 
filing date. Model 1 shows the results when only the factors related to IPO's specific 
characteristics are included in the model. Consistent with findings in the univariate analysis, 
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rivals have positive and significant valuation effects (0.360%) when the IPO is venture backed. 
This result is consistent with Lerner (1994) and Brav and Gompers (1997) who demonstrate that 
venture backed IPOs are successful in timing the market and better than non-venture backed 
IPOs. The implication is that the signaling and timing ability of venture backed IPOs have a 
positive impact on industry rivals; they experience significant positive valuation effects because 
investors reassess the value of similar existing publicly traded firms at the time a venture 
capitalist brings a firm public. The positive coefficient estimate on relative size of IPO firm 
(0.055%) suggests that the larger the size of IPO firm relative to industry counterparts, the higher 
the individual rival's reaction. This suggests that larger IPO firms relative to their rivals convey 
more information than small IPO firms. 
Model 2 presents the results for factors related to industry and rivals' specific 
characteristics. The degree of industry concentration and level of rivals' growth opportunities are 
positively related to rival valuation effects. However, the coefficient estimate on rival size is not 
statistically significant. This implies that rival size is not an important determinant in explaining 
cross-sectional variation in individual rivals' valuation effects. 
Model 3 controls for both event specific factors and rivals specific factors, 
simultaneously. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported when the models are 
estimated separately. 
Model 4 adds the interaction between market-to-book ratio and concentration level 
measured by Herfindahl Index. There are four possible categories: high M/B, high HI; high M/B, 
low HI; low M/B, high HI and low M/B, low HI. For this case, a set of binary variables is 
necessary. To avoid the dummy variable trap, we drop the dummy variable for the last category 
(low M/B, low HI). The coefficient for high M/B, high HI category is positive (0.376%) and 
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significant at 5% level which implies that rivals with high growth options in highly concentrated 
industries have higher reaction than those with low growth options that operate in less 
concentrated industries. Rivals with high market-to book value that operate in less concentrated 
industries also have higher reaction than those with low market-to-book value in less 
concentrated industries (0.168%). This suggests that in a competitive environment, rivals with 
high market-to-book value have a higher propensity to take advantage of growth options signaled 
at the IPO filing date, or to respond to a competitive threat of a new incumbent. Low market-to-
book rivals that operate in highly concentrated industries react more than those with the same 
degree of valuation but operating in less concentrated industries (0.217%). These results are 
consistent with those presented in Table 7. 
 
3.3. Impact of Price Revisions on Rivals' Valuation  
 The book-building phase (the period between filing date and offer date) is a two-way 
information channel. Going public firms reveal information at the time they file an initial public 
offering prospectus and receive information (positive/negative) from informed investors during 
the road show. Based on the type of information received, firms adjust the offer price 
(upward/downward) and make public the new information at the time of listing. To test the 
hypothesis that price revisions have a significant impact on rivals in the same industry, we divide 
the IPO sample in upward price revisions and downward price revisions. Then, we calculate rival 
portfolios CARs for different event windows (day 0 is the offer day). Table 10 shows the median 
CARs for rival portfolios in response to upward/downward IPO price revisions. For all event 
windows, the median CARs is negative and statistically significant in response to downward 
price revisions. As expected, negative information revealed in the form of downward price 
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revisions makes rivals worse off and this can be explained as rivals being overly optimistic about 
the future prospects within the industry at the time the IPO firm files with SEC. On the other 
hand, the median CARs is insignificant in response to upward price revisions, which suggests 
that rivals do not react to subsequent information released, if this information is positive. It might 
be the case that they already incorporated the positive information generated by going public 
decisions at the filing date, or there are offsetting positive and negative effects. To further 
examine the impact of price revisions on rival's valuation effects, we examine the variation of 
industry rival portfolios CARs for subsamples of venture backed IPOs and non-venture backed 
IPOs. Table 11 (Panel A) shows that for venture-backed IPOs, downward price revisions have 
negative impact on rivals, while upward revisions create positive wealth for rivals. However, 
wealth loss under downward revision far exceeds the wealth gains resulting from upward 
revisions. Upward price revision information generates opposite reactions for industry rivals.  
Positive and significant reaction is documented for venture backed IPOs sample (0.111%) but 
negative and significant reaction for non-venture backed IPOs sample (-0.228%). This implies 
that investors in rival firms interpret the positive information at the offering day as good news for 
industry only when this is certified by a venture capitalist. 
 In Panel B, the results show that regardless of rivals' characteristics, downward price 
revisions adversely affect rival firms within the same industry. The magnitude of information 
transfer is higher for small size, low market-to-book rivals and for those in less concentrated 
industries. Rivals reaction in response to upward price revisions is differentiated based on their 
characteristics. The results show that only high market-to-book rivals have the ability to take 
advantage of positive prospects available in the industry. However, their reaction is small 
(0.019%) and marginally significant at 10% level. 
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 Overall, the results in Table 11 are consistent with hypothesis that negative information 
revealed in the form of downward price revisions adversely impacts rival firms within the same 
industry. 
 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This study provides evidence that going public decisions have positive informational 
externalities on existing publicly traded firms within the same industry. The positive valuation 
effects of rival firms are driven by venture backed IPOs externality which indicates that the 
presence of venture capitalists signals positive prospects for industry and this information is 
transferred to industry rivals. This finding is consistent with hypothesis that a venture backed 
IPO signals superior information to the market than a non-venture backed IPO and investors 
react differently depending on the event specific characteristics. Another important result is that 
rivals with high market-to-book value experience positive and significant valuation effects in 
response to venture backed IPOs and low market-to-book value rivals have negative and 
significant valuation effects in response to non-venture backed IPOs. This implies that high 
market-to-book rivals have the ability to incorporate future growth opportunities available within 
an industry when this information is signaled at the filing date. On the other hand, low market-to-
book rivals that operate in less concentrated industries may have a competitive disadvantage 
when a non-venture backed IPO firm enters, probably because the newly public firm is more 
technologically advanced than its rivals. 
 One important factor that influences the direction and magnitude of rivals' valuation 
effects is the relative size of IPO firm. The evidence suggests that the larger the size of IPO firm 
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relative to industry counterparts, the greater the impact on rivals. Rivals experience more 
positive wealth effects when a relatively larger firm goes public. 
 When a venture-backed IPO undergoes downward price revision at the offering date, it entails 
negative valuation consequence for rivals. However, the opposite does not hold when upward 
price revisions occur. It might be the case that they already incorporated the positive information 
generated by going public decisions at the filing date. 
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Table 1 
Frequency of IPOs across years 
 
The sample consists of all IPOs by industrial firms during the 1983-2001 
period that satisfy the following criteria: (a) firms have financial data on 
Compustat during 1983-2001 (both active and research); (b) there are at 
least five rival firms within the same four-digit SIC code for any given IPO 
event; (c) the offer price is at least $5 and information about filing price 
range exists in SDC. The final sample consists of 1,681 IPO events; of 
these, 563 are venture backed IPOs and 1,118 are non-venture backed 
IPOs.   
 
Year Venture Backed IPOs Non Venture Backed IPOs Total 
1983 35 62 97 
1984 16 42 58 
1985 19 52 71 
1986 35 69 104 
1987 20 76 96 
1988 14 27 41 
1989 17 24 41 
1990 22 23 45 
1991 29 38 67 
1992 58 55 113 
1993 57 76 133 
1994 27 98 125 
1995 29 71 100 
1996 52      103 155 
1997 36      100 136 
1998 15 79 94 
1999 32 55 87 
2000 39 40 79 
2001 11 28 39 
Total                563   1,118 1,681 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for IPOs sample 
 
The sample consists of all IPOs by industrial firms during the 1983-2001. To enter in the sample, the following criteria are 
required: firms have financial data on Compustat during 1983-2001 (both active and research), there are at least five rival firms 
within the same four-digit SIC for any given IPO event and the offer price is at least $5 and information about filing price range 
exists in SDC. Market value is computed as market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities. Market/Book is the ratio of 
market value to total assets. 
Non-Venture Backed IPOs Venture Backed IPOs Full Sample 
Proceeds 
 
Market/ 
Book 
Value 
Total 
Assets Proceeds
Market/ 
Book Value Total Assets Proceeds
Market/ 
Book 
Value 
Total 
Assets Year N 
Medians 
N 
Medians 
N 
Medians 
1983         62 13.4  1.8 31.9 35 15.3 2.5 26.9 97 14.9 2.0 29.0
1984 42   7.8 1.5 23.6 16 12.0 1.9 33.7 58   8.6 1.6 27.9 
1985             
            
             
             
             
             
           
             
             
52 11.7 2.1 30.7 19 15.2 1.8 34.4 71 13.0 2.1 33.5
1986 69 12.0 1.7 31.7 35 14.9 2.1 34.6     104 
 
12.2 1.8 31.9 
1987 76 15.1 1.5 47.6 20 17.6 1.7 41.3 96 16.5 1.5 45.6
1988 27 17.2 1.8 69.7 14 15.9 2.5 44.9 41 16.5 2.3 57.7
1989 24 20.9 1.5  113.0 17 15.2 2.3 36.7 41 19.6 2.0 62.2
1990 23 22.5 1.3 54.8 22 24.6 1.9 66.4 45 24.2 1.5 62.7
1991 38 24.9 1.7 87.8 29 32.5 2.8 65.3 67 29.0 2.2 75.6
1992 55 34.4 2.0 75.2 58 32.1 2.4 61.8     113 33.4 2.1 69.9 
1993 76 22.7 1.9 70.8 57 27.0 2.0 56.1     133 25.2 2.0 64.9 
1994 98 22.5 1.8 44.0 27 17.6 2.3 38.6     125 22.4 1.8 43.7 
1995 71 31.5 2.3 75.1 29 33.6 2.7 63.8     100 33.5 2.3 66.6 
1996     103 31.9 2.4 58.8 52 43.0 2.5 68.0     155 33.6 2.4 63.2 
1997     100 
 
29.0 2.1 67.7 36 35.9 3.8 65.3     136 
 
32.8 2.3 67.6 
1998 79 55.3 1.5  152.4 15 35.0 1.9 66.8 94 49.5 1.7  105.5
1999 55 54.0 2.4  153.8 32 67.9 3.4 138.9 87 64.4 3.4  146.7
2000 40 77.0 1.6  155.1 39 75.0 2.2 105.3 79 75.0 1.9  135.6
2001 28   106.1 2.3  193.5 11 90.0 2.5 193.7 39 93.8 2.4  193.7 
Total    1,118 26.0 1.8 63.1      563 30.0 2.4 60.8  1,681 27.5 2.0 62.0 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Rivals' Sample 
 
The sample consists of all rival firms for 1983-2001 period that 
satisfy the following criteria: they have daily stock returns 
available in the CRSP database, there are at least 5 rival firms 
in each four-digit SIC code with available financial data in the 
Compustat database for any given IPO, rival firms have no 
major confounding event around IPO announcements. 
 
Rival firms 
Total 
Assets Sales M/B Year N 
Median Median Median 
1983 1,616 44.46 56.32 1.48 
1984 1,170 37.94 46.75 1.34 
1985 1,432 37.19 47.19 1.43 
1986 2,041 40.72 43.51 1.38 
1987 1,884 45.05 46.94 1.27 
1988 1,058 32.14 35.32 1.29 
1989 1,153 46.68 48.98 1.39 
1990 1,200 40.63 43.39 1.27 
1991 1,424 51.38 65.82 1.55 
1992 2,225 61.82 67.18 1.48 
1993 2,661 69.59 79.63 1.57 
1994 2,743 77.65 86.06 1.49 
1995 2,647 78.37 80.97 1.75 
1996 3,266 87.41 87.67 1.68 
1997 3,336 84.34 77.26 1.78 
1998 2,749 89.23 83.07 1.61 
1999 2,167 115.05 104.27 1.90 
2000 2,473 120.48 96.20 1.57 
2001 1,546 104.65 65.87 1.83 
Total   38,791 68.95 69.37 1.54 
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Table 4 
Rivals' reaction in response to IPO announcements 
 
This table presents 3-day mean and median announcement period cumulative 
abnormal return (%) for rival portfolios in response to initial public offerings 
conducted during 1983-2001 period. The abnormal returns are equally weighted 
market adjusted returns. N is the number of observations that have the same 
four-digit SIC code as IPO firms, have no major confounding event around IPO 
announcements and have announcement period return available on CRSP. ***, 
**, and  * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 N Mean Median 
All rivals 38,791 0.371*** 0.279** 
 
Large size rivals 
 (above industry median) 
21,162 0.302*** 0.258** 
 
Small size rivals 
  (below industry median) 
17,629 0.433***   0.061 
 
High M/B rivals 
 (above industry median) 
19,177 0.618***  0.356*** 
 
Low M/B rivals 
(below industry median) 
19,614  0.139 -0.103 
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Table 5 
CARs for rival industry portfolios partitioned by event and rivals' characteristics 
 
This table shows 3-day CARs based on whether IPOs are venture backed or not. Within each group, I split the sample in subgroups based 
on rivals' specific characteristics (market-to-book ratio, size, and industry concentration level). The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of 
market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to book value of total assets. Rival size is proxied by total assets. The level of 
concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the four-digit SIC code. Panel 
A presents the mean and median CARs for rival industry portfolios in response to venture-backed IPO announcements. Panel B presents the 
mean and median CARs for rival industry portfolios in response to non-venture backed IPO announcements. The t-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z 
are used to test statistical differences in mean and median between two subsamples. ***, **, and  * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.  
 Panel A: Rivals' reaction in response to 
venture backed IPOs 
Panel B: Rivals' reaction in response to 
non-venture backed IPOs Difference (VC-non VC) 
 
 
     N  Mean Median N  Mean Median Mean Median
All     14,534 0.511***   0.293*** 24,257       0.060      -0.063 0.451*   0.356*** 
> median M/B 7,085 0.578***  0.377** 12,092  0.201* 0.110 0.377* 0.267** 
≤  median M/B 7,449 0.478***      0.177 12,165      -0.062  -0.192*   0.540** 0.369** 
Mean Difference         
( High-Low) 
    0.100      
    
  0.263* 
Median Difference 
(High-Low) 0.200     0.302* 
>median size 7,892 0.311*** 0.168 13,270 0.085 -0.032 0.226*      0.200* 
≤median size 6,642 0.726*** 0.270 10,987      -0.009 -0.143    0.735***  0.413** 
Mean Difference         
( Large-Small) 
   -0.415   0.094    
  Median Difference 
(Large-Small) 
      -0.102    0.111 
> median HI 6,684 0.570** 0.240* 11,811 0.001 -0.080 0.569** 0.320** 
≤  median HI 7,850 0.400** 0.390* 12,446  0.200* -0.040     0.200   0.430*** 
Mean Difference         
( High-Low)      0.170        -0.200  
Median Difference 
(High-Low)       -0.150   -0.040 
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Table 6 
 
Rivals' cumulative abnormal returns classified 
by level of concentration 
 
This table shows mean and median 3-day equally weighted market 
adjusted returns for rival firms classified by level of concentration. 
The level of concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) 
defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the four-
digit SIC code. The market share is the firm's annual sales at the fiscal 
year-end prior to IPO announcement as a percentage of the industry's. 
The t-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z are used to test statistical differences in 
mean and median between two subsamples. ***, **, and  * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
HI N (rivals) Mean Median 
>median 18,495 0.175* 0.023 
≤median 20,296   0.270** 0.115 
Difference in mean      -0.096  
Difference in median   -0.093 
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Table 7 
 
Two-way classification of industry rivals' portfolios  
 
This table presents the mean (median) 3-day rivals' CARs based on various cross-
classifications. HI is the Herfindhal Index defined as the sum of square market share of 
each firm in the four-digit SIC code. The market share is the firm's annual sales at the fiscal 
year-end prior to IPO announcement as a percentage of the industry's. The market-to-book 
ratio is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to book value of 
total assets. Rival size is proxied by total assets. ***, **, and  * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
A. Venture Backed IPOs (N=563)  
 Above median HI Below median HI 
  CAR (%) CAR (%) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Above median M/B 3331 0.75**  0.07* 3754 0.38* -0.11 
Below median M/B 3353 0.50** -0.13 4096 0.21 -0.14* 
   
 Above median HI Below median HI 
  CAR (%) CAR (%) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Above median size 3679 0.36** -0.03 4213 0.20* -0.08 
Below median size 3005 0.93** -0.08 3637 0.41 -0.19* 
   
B. Non Venture Backed IPOs (N=1,118)  
 Above median HI Below median HI 
  CAR (%) CAR (%) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Above median M/B 5866 0.24* -0.24* 6226 0.06 -0.23* 
Below median M/B 5945 0.00 -0.34** 6220 0.04 -0.49** 
   
 Above median HI Below median HI 
  CAR (%) CAR (%) 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Above median size 6367 0.17* -0.15 6903 0.00 -0.27* 
Below median size 5444 0.06 -0.47** 5543 0.03 -0.48* 
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Table 8 
 
The impact of the relative size of IPO firm on industry rivals 
 
This table shows the median/mean CARs for rival portfolios classified by the relative size 
of IPO firm. Rival firms include firms on Compustat that have the same four-digit SIC 
code as IPO firm, do not a have a major public announcement around IPO filing date and 
have returns available on CRSP database. The sample covers the 1983-2001 period. The 
relative size of IPO firm is defined as the ratio of IPO firm's total assets to rival's total 
assets. ***, **, and  * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A Relative size of IPO firm 
 
 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q4 Q1-Q4 
 Smallest 
IPO firms 
Largest IPO 
firms 
 
 Median Median Median Median p-value 
CAR (-1, 0) 0.12 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.00 
CAR (-1,1) 0.12 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.03 
CAR (-2, 2) 0.11    0.36** 0.41*** 0.63*** 0.00 
 
Panel B Relative size of IPO firm  
 Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q1-Q4 
 Smallest 
IPO firms 
Largest IPO 
firms 
 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean p-value 
CAR (-1, 0) -0.01 0.18** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.01 
CAR (-1,1) 0.11 0.17**    0.19** 0.28*** 0.01 
CAR (-2, 2) 0.08 0.22**    0.30** 0.47*** 0.00 
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Table 9  
 
Cross-sectional variation in rivals' valuation effects 
 
This table shows the results of individual rival valuation effects in response to an IPO 
filing. The dependent variable is the 3-day individual rival abnormal returns. Relative size 
of IPO firm is the ratio of IPO firm's total assets to rival's total assets. VC backed IPO is 
equal to 1 if IPO is venture backed and zero otherwise. HI is equal to 1 if the rival operates 
in a highly concentrated industry and zero otherwise. Rival's M/B equals 1 if it exceeds the 
industry median. M/B is the ratio of market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to 
book value of total assets. Rival's relative size equals 1 if rival size exceeds the industry 
median. Rival size is proxied by its total assets. ***, **, and  * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 
 
0.111*** 0.187**      0.160      0.223 
Relative size of IPO 
firm 
    0.055**  0.055** 0.061** 
VC backed IPO 
 
0.360***    0.354***   0.335*** 
HI dummy  
 
 0.144*      0.161*  
Rivals' M/B 
 
   0.084** 0.090**  
Rival size relative to 
industry 
      -0.109     -0.118     -0.199 
 
High M/B, High HI 
   
0.376** 
 
High M/B, Low HI 
   
0.168** 
 
Low M/B, High HI 
   
     0.217* 
 
2R  0.093 0.095 0.103      0.110 
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Table 10 
 
Rivals' cumulative abnormal returns in response to 
 IPO price revisions 
 
 
This table presents the median CARs for rival firms classified by the direction of IPO price 
revisions (upward and downward). The event day (0) is the offering day. The sample covers 
the 1983-2001 period. Price revisions equal the ratio of (offer price-mid filing price) to mid 
filing price. The Wilcoxon rank sum test performs statistical differences in median between 
two independent subsamples. ***, **, and  * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
  Median CARs 
 
  
 
 (-1, 0) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) 
Upward 
(N=647 IPOs) 
     -0.067       -0.074      -0.225 
IPO price 
revisions* Downward 
(N=840 IPOs) 
-0.220*** -0.333*** -0.398*** 
 
Difference in median -0.153*** -0.259*** -0.172*** 
*194 IPOs have no price revisions 
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Table 11 
Impact of price revisions partitioned by event and rivals' specific characteristics 
 
This table shows 3-day rivals CARs in response to upward/downward price revisions (day 0 is the offer day). Within each group 
(downward/upward), I split the sample in subgroups based on event characteristics (venture backed or non-venture backed IPOS) and 
rivals' specific characteristics (market-to-book ratio, size, and industry concentration level). The market-to-book ratio is the ratio of 
market value of equity plus book value of liabilities to book value of total assets. Rival size is proxied by total assets. The level of 
concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the four-digit SIC code. 
Panel A shows the impact of price revisions and event specific characteristic. Panel B shows the impact of price revisions and rivals' 
specific characteristics. The t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test performs the statistical differences in means/medians for two 
subsamples. ***, **, and  * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Impact of price revisions and event specific characteristics 
 Downward price revisions Upward price revisions   
 CAR (%) CAR (%) Difference (D-U) 
      N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Venture backed IPOs 5,894 -0.260** -0.313** 7,351   0.190**  0.111* -0.450** -0.424** 
Non-venture backed IPOs   11,674   -0.240* -0.341** 9,022  -0.350** -0.228*  0.110 -0.113 
Difference (non-VC-VC)    0.020    -0.028   -0.540* -0.339*   
Panel B: Impact of price revisions and rivals' specific characteristics  
 Downward price revisions Upward price revisions   
 CAR (%) CAR (%) Difference (D-U) 
      N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Above median size 9,651  -0.234* -0.302** 9,036   0.040  0.051 -0.274* -0.353** 
Below median size       7,917 -0.384** -0.367** 7,337 -0.230** -0.259* -0.154* -0.108 
Difference (S-L)   -0.150*    -0.065  -0.270** -0.310**   
Above median M/B 8,700  -0.210 -0.230** 7,993   0.100  0.019* -0.310** -0.249** 
Below Median M/B 8,868  -0.471* -0.410** 8,380  0.231** -0.165* -0.702*** -0.245* 
Difference (L-H)   -0.261*    -0.18    0.131 -0.184**   
Above median HI 8,654 -0.144** -0.227** 7,479  -0.054 -0.102 -0.090 -0.125 
Below median HI 8,914 -0.365** -0.415** 8,894  -0.014 -0.038 -0.351*** -0.377** 
Difference (L-H)  -0.221*    -0.188    0.040  0.064 
*194 IPOs have no price revision 
 
